affairs. In Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners
8 in 1964, the House of Lords extended the duty of care to make pure economic loss recoverable (ie where financial loss was not consequential upon physical injury or damage to property). The courts have, with relative ease, been able to define the standard of care required from people doing everyday things like driving a car or attacking a door handle to a door. A greater challenge, however, has come from the need to formulate with precision the standard required from experts like doctors and engineers. The requirement is made not only by the common law but also by statute. Section 13(1) of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 requires that in a contract fro the supply of a service a contract term be implied to the effect that the service be carried out with "reasonable care and skill". 9 Experts are required to exercise a degree of care and skill that is reasonable in their profession. A professional will not be negligent simply because a small body of experts in the same field do not endorse the defendant's method of work.
An early case dealing with the level of professional standards required by law was Lanphier v Phipos in 1838 10 . In that case, involving an allegation of poor treatment by a doctor, Chief Justice Tindal said that:
"Every person who enters a learned profession undertakes to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case, nor does a surgeon undertake that he will perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the highest possible degree of skill. There may be persons who have higher education and greater advantages than he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and expressed a formula which has become adopted as the modern benchmark for the standard of skill required of experts. The case concerned the conduct of a doctor performing electroconvulsive therapy, but the formula has been recognised as the one to be used in respect of other fields of expertise. 13 McNair J., said that in the ordinary case which does not involve any special care or skill, negligence in law means a failure to do some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances would do, or the doing of some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances would not do. In the ordinary case the relevant standard is that of "the ordinary man", that is, "the man on the top of the Clapham omnibus". 14 But, McNair J., went on:
"where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of the Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not posses the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art."
15 Particular difficulties will arise if the judiciary has to cultivate a detailed development the law of negligence in relation to the delivery of education. One challenge will come from the rule that although deviation from proper practice generates liability, the nature of "proper practice" is affected by time and place. As Tony Weir, one leading authority in the field, has observed: "one cannot demand from a garage in the West Highlands of Scotland the same standard of expedition and professional competence which can be hoped for in the metropolis". Philips' ears. He also gave evidence that he had disinfected the instrument in a flame before packing it into his back when leaving for Whiteleys.
Two days later, and in accordance with a plan made weeks earlier, Mrs Philips went into hospital for a major operation to remove her gall bladder. During her stay her ears troubled her, and then she suffered a very bad neck infection which required surgery to open and drain a very painful abscess. 6 6 6
Mrs. Philips alleged negligence against Mr Couzens, and thus Whiteleys who were legally responsible for his work, in that he failed to render sterile the piercing instrument that he used.
In his judgement, finding for the defendants, Goddard J. said that while it was admitted that Mr
Couzens did not use the same precautions of procuring an aseptic condition of his instruments as a doctor or a surgeon would use, he could not be called upon to use that degree of care:
"Whiteleys have to see that whoever they employ for the operation uses the standard of care and skill that may be expected from a jeweller, and, of course, if the operation is negligently performed -if, for instance, a wholly unsuitable instrument were used, so that the ear was badly torn, or something of that sort happened -undoubtedly they would be liable. So, too, if they did not take that degree of care to see that the instruments were clean which one would expect a It is quite possible that this principle could apply to pedagogic and examination matters. Will the standards to be expected of academics and examiners depend upon the level of their experience and qualifications? There is now, for example, an intense and intensifying commercial competition between GCSE and A-level examination boards to recruit more examination centres. It is foreseeable that sooner or later an examination board might be tempted or pressured into cutting some of its overhead costs by reducing the number of examiners for each thousand of its scripts (thus increasing the workload and strain on any given examiner) or try to reduce its operating costs by reducing the number of senior, richlyexperienced, and highly-qualified examiners. Looking at the law as expressed in Philips, it is a moot point whether such reduced standards on the part of an examination board would have a significant legal implication; but, in any event, the possibility of an increased legal jeopardy cannot be discounted.
The cases of alleged medical negligence show that the courts have experienced great difficulty in evaluating the conduct of specialists in an esoteric field. Some educational litigation revolves around points of alleged organisational or procedural negligence (in which the courts are experienced arbiters) but many grievances from pupils and students today concern accusations of bad academic judgement in relation to grades for assignments, dissertations, examinations, and degree classification. As and when the courts have to judge the quality of academic opinion the issues will be possibly even more vexed than those concerning the clinical judgement and performance of physicians.
A science like medicine (pace those who emphasise the art of medical practice) can at least, in it was still open to the judge to find that such a small percentage of surgeons constituted a "responsible" body of practitioners.
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As Davies has very clearly shown 23 , the English courts have tended to resolve that, provided 9 9 9
institutions follow the rules of natural justice in the way they examine or deal with appeals, they "We would hold that where what is sought to be impugned is on the evidence no more than an informed exercise of academic judgement, fairness alone will not require reasons to be given. This is not to say for a moment that academic decisions are beyond challenge. A mark, for example, awarded at an examiners' meeting where irrelevant and damaging personal factors have been allowed to enter into the evaluation of the candidate's written papers something more than an informed exercise of academic judgement. Where evidence shows that something extraneous has entered into the process of academic judgement, one of two results may follow depending on the nature of the fault: either the decision will fall without more, or the court may require reasons to be given, so that the decision can either be seen to be sound or (absent reasons) be inferred to be flawed. But purely academic judgements, in our view, will as a rule, not be in the class of case...where the nature and impact of the decision itself call for reasons as a routine aspect of procedural fairness." 25 Furthermore, as Davies has argued, 26 each subject has its own specialist language, rather than 10 10 10 one for any academic profession as a whole, and "divisions between subject disciplines may be seen as constituting individual professions within academia". The clearer the existence of such specialism, the more difficult the task of judicial re-evaluation of professional opinion. Another Divisional Court judicial review decision, R v Manchester Metropolitan University, ex parte Nolan 27 also recognised the sovereignty of the examination board on matters of pure academic opinion. When courts in other jurisdictions have occasionally succumbed to re-evaluating student work with the help of experts for both the complainant student and the examination board the mission has usually begotten more problems than it has solved. In one case cited by Davies 28 , for example, the American court decided that an academic decision was `arbitrary and capricious'
having heard evidence from both sides about the grades awarded to examination papers. In court, however, the experts attributed widely disparate marks to the same piece of work -grades ranging from 57 per cent to 94 per cent.
Two factors seem to be involved in the steady rise in legal actions involving educational issues.
The first is the general context of society becoming more rights-conscious and litigious. This is the age of the Charter and a profusion of media legal advice columns and programmes. Charters have also been issued by the Department for Education and, by Universities themselves to assist 11 11 11
in the competition to recruit good students.
The second is the growing personal financial stake in education contributed by students and their parents. Many students now work long hours to fund their studies, or are supported by parents who make great financial sacrifices. It has been estimated that the average cost of a degree to a student today is over  10,000. According to a recent survey by Barclays Bank, the average debt of finalists in 1996 was up 32 per cent on last year. Another recent piece of research by the Policy Studies Institute (based on interviews with 1,971 students at 73 institutions) found that the average student received  3,615 income in the 1995/6 academic year and spent  5,091. 29 . The shortfall was funded by student loans, commercial credit, savings, and delayed payment of bills. The study also found that half of all students questioned worked in employment for 10 hours per week. Mature students were in a worse position than seven years ago and were generally finding it very difficult to make ends meet. In such a setting, student dissatisfaction with course quality or with exam results is more clearly foreseeable than it was twenty years ago.
Litigation against universities is not just confined to actions for negligence or breach of contract.
In 1996, a ten year campaign by a former Bristol University student ended when his case was rejected in the Court of Appeal. In 1986, Francis Foecke was originally awarded a first-class degree in mathematics. He had not been regarded by his tutors as an especially bright student and yet, although he took 13 finals papers (an unprecedented number), he gained first-class results in all. An inquiry was ordered after the discovery that his answers exactly mirrored the model answers prepared by the examiner, including some errors, and Mr Foecke first-class 12 12 12 degree was withdrawn. Mr Foecke, who spent  50,000 pursuing various legal cases including a libel action against the university, has now indicated he may take the matter to the European courts.
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Another recent litigation development with potentially significant consequences in the realm of education is the legal action of two former pupils who are suing their schools for having given them a poor education. 31 The claims are based upon the reports of governmental inspectors which `failed' certain schools in a national survey. One case concerns an 18-year-old girl who left school three years ago with no GCSEs. The other case involves an 18-year-old boy who received poor grades despite being expected by some to do very well. The litigants are suing for the cost of tuition and maintenance while they study to re-take exams, and for loss of earnings due to delayed entry on to the jobs market. If successful, the case could constitute precedent for children in similar positions at all schools failed by government inspectors.
During the last twenty years the volume of litigation against doctors, and health authorities has grown significantly. There are currently about 20,000 claims outstanding against the NHS.
About 2,500 have a value in excess of  100,000. As a result the cost of medical insurance for doctors has soared and the art of "defensive medicine" has burgeoned, whereby practitioners are encouraged to quickly resort to a procedure which will leave them least open to legal attack even if such a procedure is drastic and not necessarily in the best interests of a patient. The proportion of babies delivered by Caesarian, for example, has quadrupled since 1977.
